Can music represent? Does it
matter it if can? Roger Scruton and Peter Kivy tackle these two questions in
two articles concerning music’s representational powers: Representation in
Music (Scruton) and Sound and Semblance (Kivy). Scruton takes a
two-pronged approach to the question of musical representation arguing that 1)
music cannot represent things and 2) even if it could, such representation is
irrelevant to the appreciation of the music. Kivy attempts to rebut both these
charges. In this paper I will outline both Scruton’s and Kivy’s positions and
argue that Kivy is correct in thinking that music can represent and that in
certain cases, such representation is crucial to understanding the music.
Finally, I will offer some arguments against Scruton that are not directly
addressed by Kivy.
In answering the question, "Can
music represent?" Scruton outlines five conditions that "describe the
aesthetic significance of representation."11
Three of these are relevant to his discussion concerning music:
1. To be a representational work, a proper understanding of
the work demands that the observer gain, "some awareness" of what is
being represented. While the observer might not completely understand what
is represented, she must still have an "adequate" appreciation of what the
work represents.
2. Following from 1), the observer must be able to
distinguish the medium of representation (e.g. paint) from the
subject of representation (e.g. a man). If the medium and the subject
are mixed up (such that one mistakes a two-dimensional painting of a man
with a painting of a two-dimensional man), then the conditions for an
adequate understanding of the representation are not fulfilled (and the
work, therefore, does not satisfy condition 1)).
3. To be a
representation, the work must "express thoughts about its subject" and to be
interested in the work is to be interested in "understanding...those
thoughts." By ‘thoughts’, Scruton means, "the sense or content of a
declarative sentence," which can either be true or false. A representational
work must generate propositions with truth-values, which are available to
all those who understand the work: "Representation...is essentially
propositional."22
Before investigating Scruton’s
view of music in light of these criteria, it is worth noting that Scruton
seems to be expressing two distinct ideas via the above criteria. In the case
of the criterion 3, Scruton gives a method for identifying whether a
work is representational; if the ‘content’ of the work does not translate into
propositions, then the work is not representational. The same is true
for criterion 2. While Scruton’s example is observer dependent (i.e. it is the
observer who fails to identify the difference between medium and subject), I
think the point he is trying to get at here (and which is relevant in his
discussion concerning music) is that those works where there is no distinction
between the medium of representation and the subject of representation are not
actually representational, because in these cases the thing that is supposedly
represented is actually there. Thus, criterion 2 gives a method of identifying
whether a (musical) work is representational based on whether there is a
distinction between the medium and the subject.
Criteria 1 is different from
criterion 2 and 3, insofar as it does not give a method for identifying
whether a work is representational, but rather gives the condition for when
representation that is in the work (or at least intended to be there)
is relevant to the work. Thus, criteria 1 tells us that representation in a
work is aesthetically relevant only when we need to be aware of the
representation and its subject in order to understand the work. Thus, in
arguing that music does not meet conditions 1-3, Scruton is really making two
claims: 1) That musical works are not representational and 2) Even if some
are, their representational elements are irrelevant to the work.
With regards to the first claim
(that music is not representational), Scruton attempts to show that music does
meet criterion 2 (in order to be representational there must be a distinction
between medium and subject) and criterion 3 (that the content of the work must
be capturable in propositions).
Scruton argues that music
cannot represent things in the way painting, for example can, because music
fails to meet criterion 3 (that whatever is represented must be expressible in
propositions)33.
According to Scruton, in order for an element in a work to be representational
it must "characterize" its subject.44
Scruton claims that in order for what is represented to be characterized (and
thereby actually represented), it is not enough that it bare a resemblance to
what it is supposed to represent, but that what it is representing is
describable in words.55
In order for this to be possible, claims Scruton, there must be a context that
sheds light on the representation, such that things can be said about it. In a
painting for example, we might see a bird. Given the context of the bird’s
position, we can form sentences of the sort, "There is a bird. It is in the
tree. It is looking left. The sun is shining on it. etc." The context allows
us to develop a more determinant description. Scruton claims that such
a context does not exist in music: "In music the context seems to add no
further precision to the ‘representational parts.'"66
Thus, while we might be tempted to say that Messiaen’s bird-song lines
represent a bird singing, the musical development of a bird-song line does not
allow for any verbal description to be developed concerning the bird-song. The
ability to put representational elements of art into words, the " ‘narrative’
element is an essential feature of the phenomenon of representation."77
Scruton concludes that because music does not have this element, it cannot
represent.
But surely, we might think,
music, being composed of sounds, can represent other sounds: "Sounds have
properties which music, being itself sound, may share; so music ought to be
able to depict sounds."88
Scruton argues that while this might seem plausible, it is wrong because in
depicting sounds, music violates criterion 2 (that there be a difference
between the subject and medium of representation). This is because when music
attempts to depict sounds, it becomes what it is depicting, by virtue of being
a sound itself. It becomes "transparent…to its subject."99
Consequently, there is no distinction between the medium and the subject: a
piece of music which contains a "representation" of another type of music,
actually has that other type of music; it is not a representation, but
actually is the thing it purports to represent. The tinkling of teaspoons in
Strauss’ Sinfonia Domestica is not representative of the actual
tinkling of teaspoons, but rather a reproduction of the actual sound.1010
According to Scruton, sounds are not differentiated by their source; so long
as two sounds sound the same, there is no "essential"1111
difference between them, regardless of whether they share a common source (or
source type). This is, says Scruton, "an inevitable consequence of the logical
properties of sounds."1212
But if that is the case, says Scruton, then the idea of sounds ‘representing’
sounds violates criterion 2, and therefore is not a case of representation
within the work at all. Thus, music cannot even represent sounds. Having shown
that music cannot really represent, Scruton changes tack to address his second
claim: That even if music can represent things in some way, the
representational element is irrelevant to the appreciation of the work.
Scruton claims that even in
those cases where a passage of music may be "heard as forest murmurs, for
example, as rushing waters,"1313
the supposed representation is irrelevant to an understanding of the music,
thereby violating criterion 1 (in order for representation to be relevant to
the work, an understanding of the work demands an awareness of what is
represented). Unlike a poem, says Scruton, where to understand and appreciate
the poem is to understand and the words, the same is not true in music, where
a passage that is supposed to represent X, can be properly understood and
appreciated without picking up on the representation: "A genuine interest in
music...may by-pass its representational pretensions all together." Scruton
gives the example of Debussy’s piece Voiles, which we might want to say
depicts the "slow drift of sails on a summer’s day."1414
According to Scruton, one can still properly appreciate Voiles
musically, without being aware of what it depicts or even that it is
depicting something. We do not need to be aware of the representation in order
to understand and appreciate the work (criterion 1), thereby making the
representation irrelevant.
Peter Kivy rebuts Scruton’s
arguments that 1) Music’s cannot represent and 2) The representation is
irrelevant to an appreciation of the work. Kivy accepts Scruton’s criteria for
something to be representational and for a representation to be aesthetically
relevant, but disagrees that music fails to meet these criteria.
Kivy begins his analysis of
Scruton by making, and then appealing to, a simple distinction. Kivy claims
that there are two types of representation Scruton might be talking about in
reference to music: 1) Musical Pictures and 2) Musical Representation.1515
For Kivy, Musical Pictures are what we might call a direct sort of
representation, where a sound is said to ‘sound like’ something else: a
passage in Messiaen sound like bird-song; there is a direct picking out
of the subject by the sound. Musical Representations on the other hand are
more general. In this case, sounds pick out something more general, more
abstract and not necessarily something that is a sound. Music then, claims
Kivy, can be said to represent a battle1616
or the Exodus.1717
According to Kivy, Scruton whether we understand Scruton to be talking about
Musical Pictures or Musical Representation, he is wrong, as there are examples
of music that meet his criteria.
Regarding Scruton’s claim that
music cannot represent, because in supposedly doing so it becomes the thing it
is representing (and therefore violates criterion 2), Kivy provides the
example of Mozart’s Musical Joke. In this piece, Mozart aims to mock a
"second-rate" composer by composing a divertimento as though it was written by
that composer.1818
In this case, the passage is not actually a divertimento by a second-rate
composer, because, claims Kivy, "it has all of Mozart’s genius,"1919
something a real second rate divertimento would not have. By the same token,
the passage is not merely an imitation, because Mozart has clearly (says Kivy)
written a wonderful piece of music - something a second-rate divertimento is
not.2020
In addition, Mozart has exaggerated certain features of the passage, in order
to make the joke more acute. The point here is that while this passage is
obviously identifiable as a take-off of a second-rate divertimento, it is not
that thing, nor even an imitation of that thing. Kivy claims that it is only
plausibly understood as representing a second-rate divertimento. In
this way then, it seems that sounds can in fact represent sounds.
Contrary to Scruton’s charge
that music cannot represent because what is represented cannot be
characterized (violating criterion 3), Kivy claims that the things represented
in music are propositional, though only minimally so.2121
Kivy grants that if musical representations say anything about their subject,
the content is minimal, but this is not to say that there is no content; the
representation is just a, "minimal conveyor of information about its
subject."2222
While a representational painting might prompt propositions such as, "There is
a bird; the bird is in the tree; the sun is shining on it," representational
music (such as bird-song music) can prompt similar propositions: "There is a
bird. It is singing a major third down, followed by a perfect fifth up." It
appears to be the case then that music can represent, insofar as what is
represented can in fact be characterized in terms of propositions. But is such
representation relevant to properly appreciate the music?
While Scruton maintains that
even in those cases where we might say there is representation in music, such
representation is irrelevant to an appreciation of the music, Kivy thinks that
in some cases it is not only true that the representation adds to the
appreciation of the music, but is also necessary for such an understanding.2323
Kivy gives the example of Weber’s Invitation to Dance, which represents
the meeting of a man and woman at a dance. While there are no musical errors
(no ‘wrong’ notes, no ‘bad’ harmony), the form of the piece is a "musical
hash, bits and pieces."2424
Musically then, its construction makes little sense. A listener unfamiliar
with the story might well conclude that the piece is poorly constructed, but
clearly this is to misunderstand the work. Were the listener aware that
the music depicts a scene at a dance, with the apparently unrelated segments
representing different aspects of the scene, then she would surely gain a
better appreciation of the musical structure in light of what the music
represents.2525
Not only is it true in this case that a failure to notice the representation
prevents a full understanding of the music, but significantly
detracts from a proper appreciation of the work. But if this is the case,
then Scruton is wrong to claim that a piece of music can be properly
appreciated without knowing or even being aware of the representational
element.
Kivy’s approach to refuting
Scruton is successful, in part because of the way he exploits a weakness in
the form of Scruton’s argument. Instead of refuting Scruton’s criteria (which
are suspect themselves), Kivy uses them to show why Scruton is mistaken. By
establishing criteria which a work must meet in order to be representational
and have the representation be aesthetically relevant, Scruton is forced to
argue that no music, because of the nature of the art form, meets the
criteria in question. Such a stringent claim becomes easy to refute if we can
even conceive of a piece of music that meets the criteria. Kivy more
than does this, by pointing to actual pieces of music that meet the criteria.
But providing examples does not explain why, or how, a piece can be
representational. As the force of Scruton’s argument seems to be based on
Kivy’s idea of Musical Pictures, we are left wanting a story that explains how
this type of representation is possible and why Scruton seems to have gone
wrong.
Why might Scruton think that
Musical Pictures, sounds representing sounds, violate criterion 2 (that there
must be a difference between the subject and medium)? Scruton’s seems to
assume that sounds are whole, complete ‘units’, such that if a sound is
‘representing’ another sound, it really is that sound because it cannot be
like it without being completely like it. But surely sounds do have
different components, such that two sounds can be similar but not identical.
Consider bird-song. Even the individual notes (not pitches) sung by the bird
are not indivisible, whole sounds - they ‘consist’ of a particular pitch (or
pitches), a particular timbre, tone, colour etc. It seems as though a flute
would be capable of capturing certain elements of the bird-song, particularly
the pitches in the order they occur in the actual bird-song. But a flute
playing a transcribed bird-song is not actually bird-song, because it does not
sound exactly like it; the timbre for example is different. Yet the
flute-bird-song shares enough of the properties with the real-bird-song (such
as the pitches) to be called bird-song. Certainly in this case we can tell the
medium of representation ("It sounds like a flute...") from the subject
("...playing bird-song"). In short, when two sounds share a certain degree of
common properties, and one sound is intended to ‘capture’ the other sound (in
a Musical Picture sort of way), then we have no problem seeing how one sound
can in fact represent another. Note that the same analysis applies to Kivy’s
example of the Mozart mock divertimento - there are enough elements in the
Mozart piece that are in common with a real second-rate divertimento that the
former can represent the latter, without actually being it because they do not
have all the same properties.
Scruton might grant this point,
but respond to Kivy’s examples by arguing that Kivy has shown that particular
pieces of music meet particular criterion. Nowhere, however, is there an
example of a piece of music that meets all the criteria, which it must
in order for there to be representation at all, let alone aesthetically
significant representation. While it is true that Kivy does not explicitly
test one piece of music against all the criteria, we can easily conceive of a
piece that meets them all.
In order to get the idea of the
piece of music that meets all the criteria, I would like to refer first to an
actual piece of music, which is the germ of the idea. There is song by Bud
Powell called Parisian Thoroughfare, which is played by the Clifford
Brown-Max Roach Quintet. The beginning of the Brown rendition has the piano
playing a very fast, two chord vamp, while Brown blows notes that are
unmistakably representing a car horn. First, we have seen that there is no
danger of Brown’s playing actually reproducing the sound of a car horn, so
this representation, meets criterion 2 (that there is a difference between the
subject and medium of representation). Second, The representation can be
expressed propositionally: "There is a car-horn. It is sounding the pitch F.
It lasts three seconds." Thus, this part of the piece meets criterion 3 (that
in order for there to be actual representation, the representation must be
capturable in propositions). Third, the notes Brown plays are not only not
related to the chords, but audibly ‘wrong’ – from a purely musical point of
view, there is no way to properly appreciate what is going on. Once, however,
we realize that Brown is representing a car-horn, we gain a proper
appreciation of what is happening. Thus, in order to properly appreciate the
beginning of the piece, the listener must be aware of the representation and
what it represents. After the brief introduction, the piece becomes a standard
jazz tune, which does not (seem) to represent, or aim to represent, anything
and can be properly appreciated in purely musical terms. But now imagine an
entire piece like the Brown-Roach introduction to Parisian
Thoroughfare. In this case, we have an entire piece that not only
represents in ways that meet criteria 2 and 3, but also demands that the
listener be aware of the representation in order to properly appreciate the
piece. Thus, contrary to what Scruton wants to suggest, there is nothing about
music qua music that prevents it from representing in an aesthetically
significant way, let alone at all.
If music can, as Kivy suggests,
represent in a meaningful way, why is Scruton so set on denying this? Scruton
might be basing his argument on the fact that music has not traditionally been
a form that is as concerned with representation as painting is. But to say
that much, if not most, music does not represent (and this is debatable) is
very different from the stronger claim that music as an art form cannot
represent and that even if it could it would be irrelevant. The fact music
does not tend to aim for representation in the same way painting traditionally
has is not a logical result of the nature of music. It seems more likely that
it is a contingent fact about our cognitive framework. In encountering objects
in the world, we rely much more on sight than sound when learning
about/appropriating the object. We tend to rely heavily on sight when
identifying and differentiating between objects. It is no surprise than that
the art form that relies almost entirely on sight should be so devoted to
representing objects. But we do not rely only on sight in this world, but
also, in this case, on sound, which opens the door to representations of the
sort Scruton denies are possible. Likewise with his second claim that even if
there is representation, it is aesthetically irrelevant, Scruton seems to be
moving from the fact that there is some music that can be properly appreciated
without an awareness of the representation (we might think Debussy’s
Voiles is an example of this), to the claim that such representation is
always irrelevant. But as we have seen above, relevant representation is not
only possible, but actually exists in some music. Having shown Scruton to be
mistaken in every instance of asserting that music can neither represent and
that any representation that is there is irrelevant, Kivy shows that music can
not only represent, but very often does.
Endnotes
1 Roger Scruton, "Representation in Music", in
Aesthetics: A Reader in the Philosophy of the Arts. David Goldblatt,
Lee B. Brown (Eds.), (Prentice Hall, New Jersey: 1997), 236 [Back]
2 Ibid., 236 [Back]
3 Ibid., 236 [Back]
4 Ibid., 238 [Back]
5 Ibid., 238 [Back]
6 Ibid., 236 [Back]
7 Ibid., 238 [Back]
8 Ibid., 241 [Back]
9 Ibid., 241 [Back]
10 Ibid., 241 [Back]
11 Ibid., 241 [Back]
12 Ibid., 241 [Back]
13 Ibid., 237 [Back]
14 Ibid., 238 [Back]
Roger Scruton, "Representation in Music", in Aesthetics:
A Reader in the Philosophy of the Arts. David Goldblatt, Lee B. Brown
(Eds.), (Prentice Hall, New Jersey: 1997), 242 [Back]
16 Ibid., 241 [Back]
17 Ibid., 242 [Back]
18 Ibid., 243 [Back]
19 Ibid., 243 [Back]
20 Ibid., 243 [Back]
21 Ibid., 246 [Back]
22 Ibid., 246 [Back]
23 Ibid., 242 [Back]
24 Ibid., 242 [Back]
25 Ibid., 243 [Back]
References
Peter Kivy, "Sound and Semblance", in Aesthetics: A Reader in the
Philosophy of the Arts. David Goldblatt, Lee B. Brown (Eds.), (Prentice
Hall, New Jersey: 1997)
Roger Scruton, "Representation in Music", in Aesthetics: A Reader in the
Philosophy of the Arts. David Goldblatt, Lee B. Brown (Eds.), (Prentice
Hall, New Jersey: 1997)